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ISABEL M. PAPPE*

The Canadian Competition Act:
A Leap Forward**
With the adoption of its new Competition Act (the Act) and the related
Competition Tribunal Act' Canada took a giant leap forward in the regulating of restrictive trade practices and of monopolistic mergers and
acquisitions. Although the bulk of the legislation took effect on June 19,
1986, the all-important chapter dealing with prenotifiable mergers was
only proclaimed on July 15, 1987.
In 1986, over 1,100 mergers and acquisitions occurred in Canada. Of
these, 67 percent were undertaken by foreign firms, especially American
ones. 2 The internationalization of markets and the establishment of free
trade between Canada and the United States will probably increase this
trend. Free trade is expected to encourage more American companies to
establish Canadian branches. It also is anticipated that firms from other
countries will seek a Canadian base as a gateway to United States markets. 3 It therefore is important that nondomestic businesses and their
legal counsel be aware of the Act.
The major amendments that the Act brings to the previous Combines
Investigation Act 4 fall into several categories. The first category involves

*B.A., LL.L., M.B.A., Member of Barreau du Qu6bec and a manager in the finance
department of a major Canadian corporation.
*The Editorial Reviewer for this article is Linda S. Foreman.
I. Can. Stat. ch. 26 (1986) is divided into two parts. Part I is the Competition Tribunal
Act. Part II, the Competition Act, amends CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by
CAN.

REV. STAT.

ch. 10 (Supp. 1, 1970),

CAN. REV. STAT.

ch. 10 (Supp. 2, 1970), farther

amended by ch. 76, 1974-76 Can. Stat. and ch. 28, 1976-77 Can Stat. [hereinafter Act].
2. Tremblay, Les Fusions et Acquisitions Donnent Naissance a une Nouvelle Industrie,
La Presse, Sept. 19, 1987, at AI0, col. I.
3. Cook, How We Hurt Ourselves on Foreign Investment, The Globe and Mail, Nov. 5,
1987, at B2, col. 2.

4. Combines Investigation Act,

CAN. REV. STAT.

ch. C-23 (1970).
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anticompetitive practices that are reviewable by a tribunal created for
that purpose. Anticompetitive activities include predatory pricing, vertical price squeezing, and the use of fighting brands. 5 The second category
deals with large-sized mergers that cannot go forward without the prior
approval of the Director of Investigation and Research (the Director). If
the Director finds that the proposed merger is likely to lessen competition
substantially, he must then apply to the Competition Tribunal to block
it. 6 Although the mergers section has only been in force for a fairly short
time, the cases to date shed light on the impact of these provisions. The
third category, which deals with modifications to the conspiracy offenses
and the related exemptions is relevant to those carrying on business in
Canada.
This article discusses the legislative changes introduced by the Act and
the effect that these amendments are likely to have upon foreign and
domestic firms currently carrying on business in Canada or planning to
do so.
I. The Competition Tribunal
The investigation of anticompetition practices, proposed mergers, and
day-to-day administration is performed by the Director and the Bureau
of Competition Policy (the Bureau). Adjudication, however, is handled
by a specialized tribunal (the Tribunal) made up of federal court judges
and laypersons. 7 Seven out of a maximum of twelve members have been
appointed to this hybrid body-four judges and three laypersons. 8 Given
the frequent reference to broad economic and commercial concepts within
the definition of anticompetitive activities, the addition of economic and
business expertise to this adjudicative body is a welcome choice. The
Canadian Government has indicated that it hopes that these laypersons
will help the Tribunal respond to the social and economic reality of today's
business world. 9

5. Act, supra note 1, § 50.
6. Id. pt. VIII, § 64.

7. Id. pt. VII; Competition Tribunal Act, supra note 1, § 3.
8. Two Lay Members Appointed to Competition Tribunal, 8 CAN. COMPETITION POC'Y
REC., pt. 3, at 2 (1987); JudicialAppointments Are Made to the Competition Tribunal, 7
CAN. COMPETITION POL'Y REC., pt. 3, at 12 (1986); Lay Member Appointed to the Competition Tribunal, 7 CAN. COMPETITION POL'Y REC., pt. 3, at 13 (1986). The lay members

of the Tribunal consist of a financial consultant, an economist who had been a member of
the previous Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, and a law professor with expertise
on the impact of economics on law and regulations.
9. CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, COMPETITION LAW AMENDMENTS:
A GUIDE If (1985) [hereinafter GUIDE].
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According to Section 10 of the Competition Tribunal Act, all proceedings, other than applications for interim orders, must be heard by a minimum of three and a maximum of five tribunal members. At least one
must be a laymember and at least one a judge. Questions of fact and of
mixed fact and law are decided by all members, while matters of law alone
are decided by judicial members only.l 0 All decisions, other than those
based on points of fact only, are fully appealable to the Federal Court of
Appeal. II The first decision rendered by the Tribunal indicates that it may
interpret the Act strictly. In the case of the Director of Investigation &
Research v. Palm Dairies Ltd. the Tribunal blocked the sale by Unicorp
Canada Corporation of Palm Dairies Ltd. to four Western dairy cooperatives on the basis that the sale would substantially lessen competition,
an anticompetitive practice. 12 Indeed, this decision, together with the
expense and time involved in a possible court case, already has led some
firms to consult the Director and arrive at settlements before legal proceedings are started. 13
II. Anticompetitive Practices
A.

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

According to the Act, a dominant position exists when any one or more
persons control, completely or substantially, a class or type of business
throughout Canada or an area thereof. The Act sets out a nonexhaustive
list of activities that are considered to be anticompetitive when practiced
by firms dominant in a given market. These provisions are especially
relevant to the pricing, product line, promotion, and distribution strategies
of Canada's many oligopolies, of which the oil and gas, liquor and beverage industries are but a few examples. 14 To be objectionable, the anticompetitive behavior of the dominant firm must be shown to substantially
lessen competition, or be likely to do so. 15
Some clarifications are necessary. A corporation that controls 15 percent of the market may not by itself dominate the market. If, however,

10.
11.
12.
First

Act, supra note 1, § 12.
Id. § 13.
Competition Tribunal [C.T.] 1 (1986); Hunter, Competition Tribunal Weighs in on
Merger Case, 7 CAN. COMPETrITON POL'Y REC., pt. 4, at 1 (1986); Oxtoby, Dairy

Trace Declared, Fin. Times Can., Jan. 12, 1987, at 3, col. I [hereinafter Oxtoby (1987)];
Oxtoby, First Test for Competition Tribunal, Fin. Times Can., Oct. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
13. Hatter, Safeway Bows to New Competition Act, Fin. Post, May 25, 1987, at 4, col. I.
14. Shenfeld & Tanny, Competition Act Looks at Efficiency, Fin. Post, Mar. 9, 1987, at
19, col. 2; Lamphier, Reversing the Trust-Busting Roles, Fin. Times Can., Mar. 3, 1986, at

2, col. I.
15. Act, supra note 1, § 51.
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that firm and competitors with similar market shares practice parallel
pricing so as to discourage new competitors from entering the market,
they may be deemed to control the market.16 Since the Act does not
define what constitutes control amongst independent firms, it probably
would be necessary to show some sort of concerted action or tacit understanding between them. 17
Pursuant to the Act, anticompetitive practices include a dominant firm
or firms selling goods at a price that is lower than the acquisition cost
(predatory pricing) or introducing a fighting brand on a temporary and
selective basis. The purpose of such behavior must be to eliminate or
discipline a competitor.18 Selling a product below cost will not per se
demonstrate predatory intent. Thus, noncost factors must also be
considered. 19
A large soft-drink bottler that repeatedly brings out a new flavor-that
is, a fighting brand-within a given region, in response to a local bottler's
specialties, might well be contravening the Act, especially if it stops making that flavor after the local bottler has withdrawn from the region. Although, by definition, a fighting brand is one that a company has brought
onto the market to compete directly against another firm's product, the
distinction must be made between fending off a competitor and attempting
to destroy it. The issue is one of both intention and degree.
Major players in the petroleum industry may dream of eliminating one
another by introducing a single fighting brand at the gas pumps, but they
are not likely to succeed. A major petroleum corporation does not usually
depend on just one brand of gas or product line for its revenue. On the
other hand, introducing one fighting brand may be sufficient to knock out
a small-time competitor who does not have other brands or a wide product
line to fall back on.
Yet, even if the objective is to discipline or eliminate the small competitor, the use of predatory pricing or of a fighting brand still may not
contravene the Act. A one-time activity is not in itself anticompetitive.
It must be shown to be a practice. Thus, it is possible that a suit under
the Act could be brought where a dominant corporation destroys a second
or third small firm. Repetition of the behavior is likely to strengthen the
presumption that the intention was not defensive. The Act, however, does
not define the word practice. The frequency, duration, and extent of the

16. Gherson, Reining in Mergers, Fin. Post, Dec. 28, 1985. at 2, col. 2.
17. Stanbury, The New Competition Act and Competition Tribunal: Not with a Bang But
a Whimper, 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 31 (1986).

18. Act. supra note I, §§ 50(d). 50(i).
19. Grover & Kwinter, The New Competition Act, 66 CAN. B. REV. 267, 294 (1987).
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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activity required to make it a practice under section 50 has yet to be
determined. Under previous legislation the term practice was given a wide
range of interpretations. Based on case law, one commentator has noted
that a practice requires repetitive acts for a period of time. On the other
hand, practice has also been interpreted to mean almost any act done
more than once in a short period. This uncertainty made convictions for
20
such things as illegal trade practices difficult.
To be objectionable, the anticompetitive behavior must also be shown
to lessen competition or be likely to do so. 2 1 Market research or analysis
may demonstrate that competition has been reduced in the past. It may
be far more difficult, however, to prove that an anticompetitive practice
is likely to lessen competition in the future. For example, in the computer
hardware and software industries, product life tends to be short and a
future loss of market share may be more a question of obsolescence than
of anticompetitive activities by other players. Indeed, product innovation,
an improved distribution network, economies of scale, and other like
examples of superior competitive performance are recognized defenses
under the Act.2 2 In its guide to the Act, the Department of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada suggests that: "If competitors fall from the
market because a dominant competitor is more effective in meeting consumer needs, this is not an abuse of power, but rather a natural conse23
quence of the competitive process."
These defenses are well-justified. Unfortunately, they may offer large,
highly profitable firms, the handy excuse that poor performance by competitors is in itself proof of a dominant firm's superior performance. 24 It
must be hoped that the Tribunal and Director will not be easily swayed
by such arguments.
Apart from the practices described above, the following are deemed to
involve an abuse of a dominant position when the objective is to prevent
or impede entry into or expansion within a market, or to eliminate a
competitor therefrom:
* Vertical price squeezing is an offense relative to the situation in which
a supplier to, for example, both the wholesale and retail markets
raises its wholesale price while holding the retail price constant. The
unintegrated retail competitor might then be forced to hold or decrease its own selling price, thereby squeezing its profit margin.

20. Stanbury, supra note 17, at 32.
21. Act, supra note 1, § 51.
22. Id. § 51(4).
23. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 22-23.

24. Stanbury, supra note 17, at 33.
WINTER 1988
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"

*

*
*
*
*

A vertical acquisition or merger with a customer or supplier so as to
prevent a competitor from gaining access to that customer or supplier.
Adopting product specifications that are incompatible with products
produced by another person. Eastman Kodak Company's manufacturing of a new film format that was compatible only with its own
new camera represents a good example of this type of activity.
Freight equalization on a competitor's plant.
Requiring or inducing a supplier either to sell only, or primarily, to
certain customers or to refrain from selling to a competitor.
Preempting scarce resources or facilities required by a competitor.
Finally, buying up products to prevent price levels from eroding also
25
constitutes an abusive practice.

The sanction for abusive practices involves the issuance of an order by
the Tribunal prohibiting the firm or firms from continuing the anticompetitive activity. If such an order is not likely to restore competition, then
the Tribunal can require divestiture of shares or assets. 26 The breakup of
a dominant firm may, however, at times, be a difficult trade-off. For example, trade barriers have encouraged foreign investors to establish branch
plants to service local markets. In a variety of manufacturing industries,
for example, food processing and consumer products, major firms, due
to the importance of economies of scale, often have been few in number
and therefore dominant. Active intervention to break up these businesses
may lead to an increased number of competitors, but not without a loss
of economies of scale. In such a situation, excess production costs could
27
outweigh the benefits of creating a more competitive market.
In the longer run, the reduction and subsequent elimination of various
trade barriers as a result of both Canada-U.S. free trade and the globalization of markets, should expose Canadian companies to greater competition. Ultimately, these developments should "permit large-scale firms
to operate in Canada without dominating the domestic market." 28 In turn,
this situation will reduce the need for intervention by the Director and
the Tribunal.
B.

DELIVERED PRICING

Abusive practices can occur not only when competition is stiff, but also
when there is little or no competition in a given area. Under section 62
of the Act, "delivered pricing" involves the practice of refusing a cus-

25.
26.
27.
28.

Act, supra note I, § 50; see Grover & Kwinter, supra note 19, at 289-96.
Act, supra note I, § 51(2).
Shenfeld & Tanny, supra note 14.
Id.
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tomer, or potential customer, delivery of an article, at any place where
the supplier engages in the practice of delivering that article to any other
customer, on the same trade terms-that is, volume, payment terms,
technical and service requirements-as would be available to the first
customer if its place of business were located in that place.
In geographical zones that have few or no competitors, a supplier may
charge higher prices or require higher volume purchases than in areas
where competition is strong. There can be a number of reasons for this.
For example, transportation costs or the lack of economies of scale may
make it more expensive to supply that area. Prices in the Canadian far
north are frequently much higher for just such reasons. A customer might
then find that it is more economical to purchase the product from the
supplier in an area where the price or minimum volume is lower. Failure
by a supplier to allow a customer, or potential customer, to do so could
contravene the Act. No offense can occur, however, if the customer can
obtain the product, in his own district from another supplier at a better
price or with a lower minimum volume. 29 The concept of "delivered
pricing" therefore takes into account Canadian demography, namely, a
relatively small population spread over a vast area, concentrated in a
limited number of major cities.
To be considered an offense, the delivered pricing practice must be
shown to have been engaged in by a major supplier or be found to be a
widespread practice in the market in question. Although it might be easy
to demonstrate that a firm is a major supplier, for example, on the basis
of its market share, it may not be so simple to prove that a smaller supplier
has committed an offense by participating in a widespread practice. As
mentioned earlier, the term practice has not been defined. Adding the
term widespread adds an element of degree without providing any criteria
for arriving at an appropriate meaning. Indeed, given the complexity of
the relevant sections of the Act, the chances of obtaining an order pro30
hibiting this practice may be minimal.
The Act also sets out a number of legitimate defenses to a claim of
delivered pricing. First, owners and registered users of a trademark are
entitled to practice delivered pricing if they can show that delivery in
another zone would affect quality standards. For example, a registered
3
user may not have adequate pre- and post-sale servicing in that area. 1
Second, a supplier cannot be forced to make large investments in plant
and equipment in order to supply the customer. For instance, if the output

29. Act, supra note 1, §§ 52, 53; GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24.

30. Stanbury, supra note 17, at 37.
31. Act, supra note I, § 53(2); GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24.
WINTER 1988
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from a given plant is already fully taken up by long-standing customers
in that region, the manufacturer cannot be forced to expand the plant
merely to accommodate a new customer32 when it can supply the latter
from another, though more costly, plant.
The offense of delivered pricing and accompanying defenses reflect the
Act's competing purposes. The Act is supposed to prevent abuse by firms
that dominate a market. On the other hand, the Act is not supposed to
strangle reasonable business practices.
III. Mergers
A.

DEFINITION AND AFFECTED PARTIES

While the U.S. government under the Reagan administration has substantially relaxed its enforcement of U.S. antimerger laws, Canada has
been toughening its rules. 33 The antimerger provisions of the Act represent
a concern to Canadian businesses and future investors alike. First, the
definition provided as to what constitutes a merger is extremely broad.
A merger is:
The acquisition or establishment, direct or indirect, by one or more persons,
whether by purchase or lease of shares or assets, by amalgamation or by comor a
bination or otherwise, of control over or significant interest in the whole
34
part of a business of a competitor, supplier, customer or other person.

The fact that the Act encompasses vertical, as well as horizontal amalgamations affects both domestic and foreign franchisers. When a Canadian
franchisee's contract is not renewed due to unsatisfactory performance,
the franchiser may decide to operate the franchise itself. Technically, such
a transaction (and indeed the mere granting of a franchise) constitutes a
merger. Should the former franchisee or another firm that has been denied
a franchise, feel that competition has been lessened by the franchiser's
actions, it could lodge a complaint with the Director. The Director, in
Such
turn, could decide to investigate and bring suit before the Tribunal. 35
suits are quite commonplace under the equivalent U.S. legislation.
The Act also could prevent the merger of Canadian subsidiaries that
results from a merger of their nondomestic parents. For instance, had the
merger provisions been in place in 1985, the acquisition of tea producer,
Brooke Bonds, Inc., by Unilever Ltd. (which in turn owns J. Lipton

32. Act, supra note 1, § 53(2); GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24.
33. Lamphier, supra note 14. Fourteen out of fifteen of the largest mega-mergers in
American history have occurred during the Reagan era.
34. Act, supra note I, § 63.
35. Breckenridge, Franchisers Assail Ottawa's Plan for New Competition Act, The Globe

and Mail, Jan. 17, 1986, at B6, col. I.
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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Company, a tea producer) might have been blocked due to a substantial
36
lessening of competition.
Furthermore, the Act, including the merger provisions, is for the first
time applicable to banks and Crown Corporations. With few exceptions,
37
banks are treated in the same fashion as any other financial institution.
The inclusion of banks and Crown Corporations reflects Canada's moving
towards privatizing Crown Corporations and deregulating its financial
industry.

B.

SUBSTANTIAL LESSENING OF COMPETITION

The Act provides that a merger is objectionable only if it prevents or
substantially lessens competition. 38 In adopting this criterion, Canada has
followed the lead of many other countries, including the United States
and Japan. 39 The Act requires that the competitive situation both before
and after the merger be considered. During the extensive consultations
with the business community that preceded introduction of the Act, businesses argued that the amount of competition that existed before the
merger was irrelevant. They proposed a different test, namely, whether
the degree of competition after the merger remained at a healthy, though
reduced, level. One of the dangers of such a post-merger test would be
the tendency to establish a present level of adequate competition to apply
across industries. Yet, what is appropriate in one industry may not be
relevant in another. It is difficult, for example, to imagine judging competition levels in the hi-tech sectors of computers and electronics on the
same basis as more traditional industries such as agriculture. Moreover,
in assessing a business sector, it is unlikely that the Tribunal or the Bureau
could develop an adequate picture merely by looking at a post-merger
snapshot. In fact, no country as yet appears to have accepted this type
40
of post-merger test.
Section 65 of the Act sets out a number of factors, or guidelines, that
may be considered by the Tribunal in determining whether competition
has been extinguished or substantially reduced. These factors serve as
guidelines for comparing the status of a given market in the past and in
the future, both with and without the merger actually occurring. The

36. Lamphier, supra note 14.

37. Act. supra note 1, §§ 2.1, 32(6.1), 33; Banks and Banking Law Review Act, Can.
Stat. ch. 40, § 255(5) (1980-1983).
38. Act, supra note 1, § 64(l).
39. GUIDE, supra 9, at 16.

40. Id.; Oxtoby, Competition Act Gets Final Look. Fin. Times Can., Apr. 21, 1986, at 4,
col. 2; Anderson, Competition Bill Felt Step Forward, The Globe and Mail, Jan. 14, 1986,

at B2, col. 5.
WINTER 1988

1080

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Tribunal may, for instance, consider the probability that one of the parties
will fail, in whole or in part, if the proposed union does not take place. 41
The loss of competition and of employment resulting from a bankruptcy
might well outweigh the impact of the merger. The acquisition by Falconbridge Ltd. of Kidd Creek Mines Ltd. offers a good example, even
though it took place before the Act was in force. Prior to the takeover,
both of these mining firms were relatively weak. Although employment
at Kidd Creek dropped substantially after the acquisition, Falconbridge's
position was strengthened internationally and Kidd Creek was placed
under good management. One commentator has noted that, "As one company, it is strong, as two each would have been weak ...

[and] the cost

would have been much higher down the road." 42 Without the takeover it
is possible that at least one, if not both, of the companies might have
43
ultimately laid off many workers.
Conversely, the Tribunal must weigh the probability that amerger would
lead to the demise of a vigorous and effective competitor. 44 In a hi-tech
industry, a merger may be the only way for a company to gain access to
the crucial innovation required to stay competitive. This innovation might
then lead to the downfall of a strong competitor. It would be difficult to
argue that the transaction should be denied without first considering the
changes and role of new developments in that market. In deciding whether
or not to allow a merger to take place, the Tribunal will have to go beyond
a simple quantitative analysis. Qualitative considerations such as nontariff
trade barriers and the ability of management to handle change are equally
important, though more difficult to assess. 45 The Act "gives great scope
for economic evidence to be introduced." 46 The availability of adequate
substitutes, foreign products, or competition, and the existence of tariffs
are additional factors, that the Tribunal will have to take into
47
consideration.
An important defense to a finding of lessened competition is proof that
gains in efficiency resulting from the merger will outweigh the reduction
in competition. Gains to be considered include a significant substitution
of Canadian goods for imported ones, a significant increase in the real
value of exports, greater economies of scale, and improved distribution

41. Act, supra note I, § 65(b).
42. McKenzie. Myths and Realities of Corporate Takeovers, 14
1987).

43. Id.
44. Act, supra note I, § 65(f).
45. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 17.

46. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 19, at 277.
47. Act. supra note 1. § 65.
VOL. 22. NO. 4
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networks. 48 Unfortunately, the Act does not provide guidance to the
Tribunal as to which is to be given greater weight-the substantial less49
ening of competition or gains in efficiency.
The Act also establishes an exception for joint ventures formed to
undertake a particular project or a research and development program.
To fall within the exception, the venture must be unincorporated and
terminate at the end of the project or program. 50 It must further be shown
that due to such things as the risk involved or the need for synergy, the
project would not have taken place without the joint venture. The oil and
gas sectors represent industries that frequently depend upon joint ventures
for the undertaking of exploration. High costs and relatively low probabilities of success make joint ventures attractive. 5 1 Similarly, the exception for Research and Development (R&D) programs reflects the
importance of such activities to Canada's becoming and remaining competitive in world markets. Compared to other industrialized nations, Canada has historically invested little in R&D. 52 It remains to be seen, however,
whether the provisions of the Act are sufficiently narrow to prevent the
Director from challenging inappropriate ventures before the Tribunal. 53
If none of these defenses are applicable, and a merger is shown to
prevent or substantially lessen competition, the Tribunal may order the
dissolution of the merger or the disposition of the shares or assets in
question. Concomitantly, if the merger has not taken place, an order
54
prohibiting it can be issued.
C.

CASE LAW

The first case decided by the Tribunal, Palm Dairies Ltd., may shed
some light on the future interpretation of the Act. When Palm's owner,
Unicorp Canada Corporation, put the dairies up for sale it received five
bids, including one from the dairies' management. Unicorp accepted the
highest bid, that of a consortium of four western Canadian dairies. Each
member of the consortium operated in separate areas, but competed with
Palm. If the consortium's proposed acquisition of Palm had proceeded,
members of the consortium would have controlled 57 percent of British

48. Id. § 68; GUIDE. supra note 9. at 16.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Stanbury, supra note 17, at 18.
Act, supra note I, § 67.
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 18.
In 1987, for example, Canada spent a mere 1.34 percent of GNP on R&D, or about

one-half of what the U.S. spends. See Fin. Post, Jan. 25, 1988, at 14, col. I; id. Feb. 8,

1988, at 20, col. 4.
53. Stanbury, supra note 17, at 18.
54. Act, supra note 1, § 71.
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Columbia's fresh drinking milk sales, 80 percent of Alberta's, and 95
percent of Saskatchewan's sales. Not surprisingly, the Director received
a substantial number of complaints regarding the acquisitions, including
eight from foodstores and twenty-one from fast food and other large res55
taurant chains.
Before the case was heard by the Tribunal, the Director arrived at a
compromise with the consortium, whereby the consortium would purchase 50 percent of Palm, and the dairies' management the remaining 50
percent. A number of other conditions to prevent the lessening of competition were also agreed to. For example, it was agreed that Palm would
be run as an independent company and that the consortium would not
purchase any additional stakes in Palm. The Director then presented the
agreement to the Tribunal for approval. The Tribunal, however, refused
to accept the agreement. Not only was the Tribunal not satisfied that
adequate competition would remain, it also queried the feasibility of administering the consortium's undertakings. The Tribunal therefore re56
fused to allow the merger to proceed.
The Director's handling of the case has not gone without criticism. It
has been argued that the Director ought to have issued an advance ruling
certificate thereby eliminating the need for a Tribunal hearing. The Director, however, has contended that various undertakings could not be
adequately contained in an advance ruling certificate. One cannot help
but wonder whether the number of protests surrounding the case did not
propel the Director into bringing this case before the Tribunal. 57 Whatever
the reason, the Palm Dairies decision is significant for parties involved
in Canadian mergers, acquisitions, and amalgamations. It encourages
companies to seek advance ruling certificates so as to avoid going before
the Tribunal.
In the case of the Director of Investigations & Research v. Sanimal

Industries, Inc. the Director applied to the Tribunal for the dissolution of
two interrelated mergers due to the substantial lessening of competition.
As a result of two acquisitions, Sanimal Industries Inc. gained control,
via subsidiaries, of 90 percent of the market for collecting rendering meat
within the Province of Quebec. After the acquisitions, Alex Couture, Inc.,
the subsidiary with the largest market share, advised its suppliers that the
price it paid for rendering material would decrease and that, in some

55. First Merger Application Under New Act, 7 CAN. COMPETITION POL'Y REC., pt. 3,
at 4 (1986) [hereinafter First Merger]; Hunter, supra note 12; Oxtoby (1987), supra note 12.
56. First Merger, supra note 55; Hunter, supra note 12; Oxtoby (1987), supra note 12.
Section 78 of the Act permits the Tribunal to reject an agreement if it would be ineffective
in achieving its intended purposes.
57. Oxtoby (1987), supra note 12.
VOL. 22. NO. 4
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cases, a delivery charge would be imposed. The remaining 10 percent of
the market was controlled by a single competitor whose operations were
concentrated in the Montreal area. That competitor was only able to
handle certain types of rendering. Hence, on the surface, it would appear
that competition had been virtually eliminated. The Director argued that
entry into the meat-rendering market was restricted by a number of economic factors. For instance, transportation costs and the perishable nature
of the product made it difficult for those operating in neighboring provinces
to service the market from their home base. Economies of scale and
surplus capacity made it necessary to enter the market at a high production
level. 58 The case will therefore require the Tribunal to deal with such
qualitative factors as barriers to entry into the market and the actual, as
opposed to theoretical, extent of competition prior to the mergers.
The case is expected to be stalemated for some time as Alex Couture,
Inc. and Sanimal have brought a suit before the Quebec Superior Court
attacking the constitutionality of the relevant sections of the Act. Alex
Couture, Inc. and Sanimal have argued that the Act deals with matters
that lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the provinces. Should they
succeed with their attempt to stay proceedings before the Tribunal until
the court can decide the constitutionality of the Act, the Director's ability
to enforce the provisions of the Act will be seriously hampered. 59

D.

ADVANCE RULINGS

Section 74 of the Act allows the Director to issue an advance ruling
certificate when he feels that a merger is not likely to eliminate or substantially lessen competition. If the merger is substantially completed
within one year after the issuance of the certificate, the Director cannot
then bring suit to block or dissolve the merger on the basis of the same,
or substantially the same, information upon which the ruling was first
issued. 60 One commentator has noted that the Director "is reluctant to
issue such a binding document when reality may not bear out the pretransaction forecasts included in a request for an Advance Ruling

58. C.T. 2 (1987); Blakney, Merger Application: Quebec Meat Rendering Industry, 8 CAN.
pt. 2, at 10 (1987).
59. Hunter, Constitutional Validity of Competition Tribunal Act and Competition Act
Challenged, 8 CAN. COMPETITION POLY REC., pt. 2, at II (1987). The plaintiffs obtained
an interlocutory injunction suspending the Tribunal hearing until October 1, 1987, by which
time the case was to have been heard by the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec. As
of December 31, 1987 no decision on the merits had been rendered. Le Procureur Gdndral
COMPETITION POL'Y REC.,

du Canada v. Alex Couture Inc. et autres et Le Tribunal de laConcurrence et autres, 1987
Receuils de Jurisprudence du Quebec [R. J. Q.] 1971.
60. Act, supra note 1, § 75.
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Certificate." 6' In that situation, instead of issuing an advance ruling certificate, the Director can issue a "comfort letter," that is, a nonbinding
preliminary opinion on the proposed merger. A comfort letter does not
preclude the Director from subsequently challenging the merger before
62
the Tribunal.
Although the Act does not prescribe specific time limits for the Director's reply to a request for an advance ruling, the Director is required to
proceed as expeditiously as possible. 63 If the Director and the Bureau are
handling a number of investigations or find the situation described under
the proposed ruling request less than clear cut, lengthy delays in obtaining
a certificate may result. 64
IV. Prenotification
The Act provides for prenotification of large mergers as post-merger
remedies are unlikely to restore competition to exactly the same level or
state as existed before these mergers. This approach is consistent with
that taken by other countries such as the United States, Australia, Japan,
65
and West Germany.
The Act provides that all persons, defined to include individuals, companies, or unincorporated entities, who possess Canadian assets or who
have annual gross sales revenue in, from, or into Canada, exceeding $400
million, may be subject to the prenotification provisions.6 6 The originally
proposed threshold of $500 million dollars was reduced in the wake of
lobbying by small firms. The $400 million threshold goes against big business's opinion that even a $500 million threshold is too low to prevent
67
unnecessary government intervention.
The prenotification requirement is triggered when a person proposes to
acquire control, directly or indirectly (e.g. through acquisition of the
parent corporation), of an operating business, the assets or gross sales

61. Addy, Competition Act: Effective 7ol or Bureaucratic Nightmare?, 14 CAN. Bus.
REV. at 34 (Winter 1987).

Id.
Act, supra note 1, § 74(2).
Addy, supra note 61.
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 19; Roberts & Hewatt, Pre-Merger Notification in Canada,
II CAN. Bus. L.J. 135 (1985).
66. Act, supra note 1, § 81.
67. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 6: Anderson, supra note 40; Oxtoby, supra note 40. By the
end of 1987 the Director and the Bureau had reviewed approximately one-third of the 1,3001,400 mergers reported since the Act came into force. It has been argued that the merger
threshold test is therefore too low, Macdonald & Rowley, Ton'ard a Realistic Policy on
Mergers, Fin. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at 14, col. 2. Contra Stanbury, No Changes Needed in
Merger Policy, Fin. Post, Feb. 8, 1988, at 16, col. 2.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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revenue of which exceed $35 million. Control is considered to be 20
percent of the voting shares of a publicly traded company or 35 percent
for a private company. If the acquisitor already owns at least 20 percent
of the voting shares, the prenotification requirement is increased to 50
percent. 68 Since the Act only refers to voting shares, it must be concluded
69
that the acquisition of nonvoting shares does not require prenotification.
When two or more corporations intend to amalgamate, the asset or gross
70
sales revenue threshold is increased from $35 million to $70 million.
The prenotification provisions also apply when two or more persons
form an unincorporated combination (for example, a limited partnership)
to carry on an existing business that has $35 million in assets or gross
sales revenue. 7 1 The Act, however, provides exemption for a combination
that does not result in a change of control over any party and whose range
of activities is restricted by a written agreement between the parties. The
agreement must also set out the parties' obligations to contribute assets,
the rules and regulations of the ongoing relation, and must provide for an
orderly termination. 72 The exemption for combinations appears to be
broader than the one provided under the general merger provisions since
the Act provides that the purpose of the combination need not be limited
to research and development programs or to special projects that would
73
not otherwise occur.
The prenotification rules were intended to guarantee a prescreening
whenever large firms make a major acquisition. As written, however, the
rules would not appear to cover acquisitions by most conglomerates. For
example, the prenotification rules would not apply to a situation in which
a conglomerate worth less than $400 million wanted to purchase control
of an operating business worth much more than itself. While a conglomerate may not dominate in a given field, the relatively small number of
players in the Canadian business establishment implies that the conglomerate may actually have a strong voice in that sector even before the
merger. This omission may prove to be an important oversight in the
74
Act.
The prenotification rules represent an additional hurdle for nonCanadian firms seeking to establish or extend their Canadian operations.
The first hurdle involves the Investment Canada Act. Any non-Canadian
68. Act, supra note I, § 82(2), (3). An "operating business" is defined as one to which
employees employed in connection with the undertaking ordinarily report.
69. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 19, at 284.
70. Act, supra note I, § 82(5).
71. Id. § 82(4).

72. Id. § 84.
73. Grover & Kwinter, supra note 19, at 286.
74. Stanbury, supra note 17. at 15.
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wishing to take over a Canadian firm with assets or sales of $5 million or
75
more must first seek approval of the Canadian Investment Agency.
Unlike its predecessor, the Foreign Investment Review Agency, the
76
Investment Canada Agency has yet to refuse any proposed investment.
Indeed, the objective of the agency is to foster investment in Canada
rather than protect Canadian industry against foreign ownership. 77 Pursuant to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the intervention of the
Investment Canada Agency will be substantially reduced. The takeover
review threshold will be raised from the current $5 million, reaching $150
million by 1992. Moreover, the review of indirect takeovers of domestic
Canadian firms by U.S. firms will be abolished after 1992.78
In contrast, the Act seeks to protect all Canadian industries, whether
foreign-owned or not, against abuses and the substantial lessening of
competition. Therefore, even with free trade, U.S. businesses seeking to
operate in Canada will still be subject to the Act.
The different mandates of the two bureaus was highlighted in the takeover of Woodward's Alberta and British Columbia foodstores by Canada
Safeway Ltd., a subsidiary of an American supermarket chain. While the
Investment Canada Agency approved the transaction, the Director insisted that Safeway dispose of twelve out of the twenty-three stores being
acquired, over a period of two years. If Safeway had not accepted these
terms, it would have been faced with the expense and publicity of a
Tribunal hearing on the takeover. 79 The Safeway agreement suggests that
much of the application of the Act is likely to go on behind closed doors,
through a process of negotiation. The Director has, in fact, signaled his
receptivity to such discussions. 80 The advance ruling provisions of the
Act also foster such activities. 8t
Negotiations can, however, be time-consuming. When a firm anticipates
that the Director may have competitive concerns about its proposed merger,
it would be well advised to consult the Director prior to filing its preno82
tification notice and far in advance of its targeted closing date.

75. Investment Canada Act, ch. 20, Stat. Can. § 14 (1985).
76. Gherson, Eased Tkeover Rules Spark Interest in the U.S., Fin. Post. Oct. 12, 1987,

at 3, col. I.
77. Investment Canada Act, supra note 75, § 14.

78. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Schedule-Part A,
Bill C-130, 33d Parl., 2d Sess., art. 1607.3. annex 1607.3, § 2 (1988).
79. Hatter, supra note 13; Canada Safeway/Woodwards Merger Agreement with Bureau

of Competition Policy, 8 CAN. COMPETITION POL'Y REC., pt. 2, at 7 (1987).
80. Hatter, sapra note 13; Goldmnan Elaborates His Views on Compliance, 8 CAN. COMPETITION POL'V Rrc., pt. 2, at 13 (1987).
81. Act, supra note I, § 74.
82. Addy, supra note 61, at 34-37.
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Not all firms, however, are willing to compromise. Indeed, the Director
has noted that the threat of a Tribunal
hearing has lead to the abandonment
83
of several potential mergers.
Firms that are required to comply with the prenotification provisions
may opt between the short-form and the long-form notice. Both forms
require a firm to supply information regarding the assets, revenues, and
business activities of the acquiror. Use of the long form, which requires
more detailed information, precludes the Director from requesting additional information and the concommitant delay entailed in gathering such
additional information. If a person opts to file the short form, the Director
may, within seven days, require him to file the longer form. The Director
is required to respond in seven days for a short-form notice or in twentyone days for a long-form notice as to whether or not he intends to challenge
the proposed merger before the Tribunal. The one exception to the longform delay involves an acquisition of shares through a stock exchange.
In that instance, the delay is reduced to ten days, or to such longer delay
as may be prescribed by the exchange, but not longer than twenty-one
days.

84

Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the delays are sufficient
for a proper review. The experience of the United States and Australia
suggests that the delays may not be sufficient. The $400 million threshold
is supposed to reduce the potential number of requests to a small and
therefore manageable number. On the other hand, the purpose of the
threshold is to help ensure that the Director reviews the most critical
transactions. Yet, by definition, these are likely to be amongst the most
complex and may well require a longer review period than that provided
85
under the Act.
V. Conspiracy
Price-fixing and other conspiracies in restraint of trade have long been
penal offenses under Canadian anticombines legislation. The Act, however, strengthens this legislation. The Act substantially increases available
penalties in an effort to create a greater deterrent. The maximum fine per
offense has risen from $1 million to $10 million. Moreover, the Crown's
burden of proof is lightened. The Crown no longer has to demonstrate
that the conspiring parties intended to unduly lessen competition. It is
sufficient to show that the parties intended to and entered into a conspiracy
and that their behavior lessened competition unduly (or would have done

83. Hatter, supra note 13.
84. Act, supra note I, § 95.
85. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 19: Roberts & Hewatt, supra note 65.
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so if the conspiracy had been put into effect). 86 This change corrects the
uncertainty that arose out of the courts' previous interpretation of the
87
Crown's burden of proof.
Even with this clarification, proving a conspiracy is still far from easy.
Frequently no oral or written communications exist to suggest a conspiracy. There may simply be an understanding or a meeting of the minds.
The evidence is likely to be circumstantial. Assessing the significance of
various events and of firms' behavior can, therefore, be problematic.88
One commentator has criticized the continued use of the word unduly
in regards to price-fixing. Only in the case of banks is price-fixing deemed
to be a per se offense, regardless of whether or not it unduly lessens
competition. Given the narrow interpretation that courts historically have
given to the word unduly, the commentator argued that the per se rule
ought to have been applied to all forms of business. In maintaining the
distinction, the legislature deferred to the business community, which had
89
opposed strengthening the price-fixing offense.
In the spirit of fostering the growth of export markets and international
trade for Canadian products, the Act provides for two exceptions to the
conspiracy offenses. The first exception deals with export agreements
entered into by legitimately formed consortia that inadvertently unduly
lessen competition in Canada. The formation of a consortium may reduce
the volume of exports while simultaneously increasing the price of these
exports, thereby creating a net benefit in favor of the Canadian economy.
Accordingly, an offense will be deemed to have been committed only if
the real value of exports is, or is likely to be, reduced or limited. 90 The
defense will not be available to a consortium, however, when the export
agreements are so closely tied to domestic activities that it is impossible
to separate the two. 91
The second exception to the conspiracy offense deals with specialization agreements. The Act defines a specialization agreement as an agreement between two or more parties that each will discontinue certain
services or products and then exclusively buy those services or products
from the other party. As long as the parties can show that the gains in
efficiency offset the lessening or preventing of competition, the Tribunal
shall consent to register a specialization agreement. The Act specifies that
86. Act, supra note I, § 32.
87. GuIDE', supra note 9, at 27; see, e.g., Atlantic Sugar Refineries v. A.G. Canada. 115
D.L.R. 21 (1980), 54 C.C.C.92d 373; see also Aetna Ins. Co. & 72 Other Corps v. The
Queen, 75 D.L.R.3d 332 (1977).
88. Stanbury. supra note 17, at 20.
89. Id. at 28-29; Stanbury, Haifa Loaf: Bill C-29, 10

CAN.

90. Act, supra note I, § 32(5)(a).
91. Id. § 32(4); Grover & Kwinter, supra note 19, at 301.
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a mere income redistribution does not demonstrate a gain in efficiency.
The Tribunal must consider if the particular specialization agreement will
either significantly increase exports or produce a significant substitution
of domestic services or products for those that were previously imported. 92 Failure to register will not make the consortium illegal, it merely
93
leaves it open to penal suit.
Unfortunately, the Act does not provide any guidelines for the duration
of registrations. The establishment of a specific time limit, with the possibility of an extension after a review of the situation, would have been
helpful. It would have ensured that these types of agreements do not
continue long after they have outlived their usefulness. 94
VI. Conclusion
In an era in which much is being made of global markets and free trade,
it may seem surprising that Canada has taken the trouble to modify its
competition legislation. Yet, the new Act becomes more comprehendable
when one considers the substantial levels of corporate concentration and
of oligopolies in Canada. Canadian legislation needed to be updated to
correspond with the equivalent rules in other Western industrialized nations. The previous Combines Investigation Act had not been substantially
changed for a number of years.
The strengthening of the provisions dealing with mergers and with the
abuse of a dominant position should facilitate the review of and, when
needed, intervention into these activities. Since few cases have gone before the Tribunal, it is too early to assess the Tribunal's impact on regulating competition. Nevertheless, the Director's willingness to discuss
and arrive at compromises, as demonstrated by such cases as Safeway
and Palm Dairies, implies that compromise is preferred to litigation. It is
to be hoped that the Act will serve as an effective but not excessive
safeguard of Canadian competition.

92. Act, supra note 1. § 57.
93. Stanbury, supra note 17, at 27.
94. Id. at 35.
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